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THE PRISONER'S RIGHT TO A STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR
PAROLE DENIAL: SILENCE IS NOT ALWAYS GOLDEN
INTRODUCTION

In New York State the Board of Parole is vested by article eight of
the correction law' with the power to grant parole to those inmates
serving indeterminant and reformatory sentences, and by the penal
law2 to grant conditional release to those inmates serving definite
sentences. 3 The decision to parole is made by a panel of at least three
board members at the prison after examining the case file of the inmate
and interviewing the inmate alone. 4 The inmate is not allowed to
examine the contents of the case file, 5 nor is he allowed at the interview to present witnesses or evidence on his behalf,6 or be represented
by counsel.7 On the basis of the case file and the interview, the parole
board members decide whether "there is a reasonable probability that,
if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and [whether] his release is not incompatible with
1.

N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40 (McKinney Supp. 1975).

3. In 1972, 4,412 inmates or 59.3 percent of all inmates released from state institutions were released by the parole board, which granted parole in 75.4 percent of all such
cases coming before it. CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRISON
WITHOUT

WALLS 27 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as PRISON

WITHOUT WALLS].

This re-

port was the product of an independent inquiry, headed by Mr. Ramsey Clark, former
United States Attorney General, and Professor Herman Schwartz, Faculty of Law
and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo. The purpose of the study
was to investigate the operation, purposes, and effectiveness of the New York parole
system. The staff of the report observed 210 parole release hearings, interviewed 30
parole officials, and over 100 parolees. It also read the annual reports of the Division
of Parole since 1930 and conducted a complete review of all statutes relating to parole
since 1877.
4. The examination of the case file and the interview lasts no longer than 5.9 minutes on the average. Usually only one of the panel members actually reads the file,
which may contain as many as 150 pages of reports, and conducts the questioning. The
questioning is often either superficial or concerned with the inmate's past crime instead
of future plans. NEv YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA 96 (1972).
For a revealing and disquieting description of the parole interview, see PRSON WITHOUT WALLS 42-49.
5. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS 44.

6. Id.; see Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
7. Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298
N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969).
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the welfare of society."" These are the only statutory criteria that the
parole board must follow in making its parole release decision. Those
inmates denied parole usually receive notification of the denial a halfday to three days after the interview. 9 The only communication of
the denial to the inmate is a statement of when the next parole consideration will take place. 10 No reasons are given for the denial, and
the statutes governing the parole determination process" do not require the board to furnish a statement of reasons.
In recent New York lower court cases, 1 2 inmates have successfully
challenged this policy of silence by the parole board. In their review
of two of these decisions, the third and fourth departments of the
appellate division are in conflict. The fourth department ruled in
Cummings v. Regan [hereinafter referred to as Cummings (Fourth)],
a class action suit brought on behalf of all inmates in New York State
who have been denied parole, that both due process and the public
policy of the state require that the parole board furnish a "meaningfUl" 1 4 statement of reasons for denial of parole. The third department,

however, in its consideration of a similar class action, Cummings v.
Regan15 [hereinafter referred to as Cummings (Third)], found nothing
in the state or federal constitutions, or the applicable statutes, that
compelled the parole board to furnish such a statement.
This conflict between the appellate courts is a result of the impact
made on New York law by the 1972 Supreme Court decision, Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 upholding a parolee's right to significant procedural
protections at a parole revocation hearing. The Morrissey decision has
8. N.Y. CoRREc.LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
9. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS 51.
10. In one case it took the form of a "terse statement 'held for one year.'" Cummings v. Regan, 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 223, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (4th Dep't 1974).
11. N.Y. CoRREc. LAw §§ 210-15 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
12. Solari v. Vincent, 77 Misc. 2d 54, 353 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Cummings v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 357, 350 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1973), rcu'd, 45 App.
Div. 2d 415, 358 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't 1974); Cummings v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d
137, 350 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260
(4th Dep't 1974). In the federal courts, see United States ex rel. Johnson v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afi'd, 500 F.2d 925 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974).
13. 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep't 1974), aff'g 76 Misc. 2d
137, 350 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Cummings (Fourth)].
14. Id. at 224, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
15. 45 App. Div. 2d 415, 358 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't 1974), reig 76 Misc. 2d
357, 350 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Cummings (Third)].
16. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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eclipsed much of the prior New York law concerning the question of
what procedural protections are necessary at a parole release hearing.
Consequently, the two Cummings courts considered whether a statement of reasons is constitutionally required by examining the implications of Morrissey for the parole release hearing, the interpretation
given Morrissey by the federal courts, and recent developments in
other states. Since Morrissey virtually "wiped the slate clean," 17 the
resolution of this conflict will significantly influence the direction the
law in New York will take in the area of procedural due process
rights of prisoners at the release stage of the parole process. Resolution of this controversy will also have a significant impact on the
judicial review of parole denials in New York.

I.

THE APPELLATE DECISIONS

A. Cummings (Fourth)-TheDecision by the Fourth Department
The petitioner, Thomas A. Cummings, and several other inmates
at the Attica Correctional Facility who were denied parole without a
statement of reasons, commenced a class action seeking a judgment in
the nature of mandamus pursuant to article 78 of the New York Civil
Practice Laws and Rules directing the respondents, New York State
Board of Parole, its Chairman, and the Commissioner of the New
York Department of Correctional Services, to furnish a meaningful
statement of reasons in support of determinations denying parole release to petitioners and all other inmates in correctional facilities in
New York State similarly situated. Special term granted the relief requested, holding that the class action was proper and that due process
attached at the parole release hearing with rudiments of due process
requiring that at a minimum a statement of reasons be given.18 The respondents appealed on the grounds that the class action was improper,
that a statement of reasons for parole denial was not constitutionally
nor statutorily required, and that the imposition of such a policy
would interfere with the broad discretionary power delegated to the
parole board by statute. The Appellate Division for the Fourth De17. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973).

18. 76 Misc. 2d 137, 350 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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partment affirmed, holding that the class action was proper and that
both due process and public policy required disclosure of reasons for
parole denial. 19
In ruling that the practice of denying inmates a statement of
reasons was inimical to public policy, the court examined the function
of parole in modem penology and the effect that such a denial would
have on the proper operation of parole in the correction system. The
court concluded that parole has become an integral part of the rehabilitative scheme of the penal system and was no longer simply an
"ad hoc exercise of clemency." 20 Thus, the policies followed by the
parole board must be scrutinized carefully in light of their overall
effect on rehabilitation. The court found that the policy of denying
inmates a statement of reasons for denial of parole severely hindered
rehabilitation and was likely to destroy whatever good had been done:
"It is difficult to conceive of a more counter-productive measure to
accomplish this end [of rehabilitation] than the present procedure...
which can only instill frustration and bitterness to an already diffi21
cult environment."
The court acknowledged the difficult responsibility placed on
the parole board by society. Both the public safety and the interest
of the prisoner in being freed must be considered by the parole board
in making its parole release determination. Despite the complexity of
this decisionmaking process and the consequent difficulty the parole
board would have in precisely identifying the reasons for parole
denial, the court found that the destructive effect on the morale of
19. The class action issue will not be dealt with in this article. However, it is significant that in its most recent decision concerning the propriety of class actions, the
court of appeals in Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 316 N.E.2d
320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1974), has expanded the scope of the New York class action
statute. Particularly relevant to the Cummings (Fourth) case is the statement by the
court of appeals in Ray that
[c]lass actions were also sustained [in the past], without difficulty, where the
relief sought was common to all members of the class, so that the relief sought
by one would satisfy all. That would be the case, for example, in an action for
an injunction or for declaratory relief ....
Id. at 152, 316 N.E.2d at 323, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 32. This buttresses the reasoning of
the court in Cummings (Fourth) that
the wrong asserted is [not] individual to the different persons involved. Rather,
it is a grievance shared by all. Similarly, the remedy sought here, that of injunction and declaration, is particularly appropriate to all members of the class.
Cummings (Fourth) at 224, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 262-63.
20. 45 App. Div. 2d at 225, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 263, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
21. 45 App. Div. 2d at 226, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 264.

PAROLE DENIAL

the prisoners of the policy of silence was too great to permit its
continuance.
As the second basis for its decision, the court found that the requirements of due process compelled a statement of reasons for parole
denial. The court began its analysis by examining the implications of
the Supreme Court decision, Morrissey v. Brewer. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that due process attached at the parole revocation hearing and, consequently, minimum due process required that
an informal proceeding be held wherein the parolee would be given
an opportunity to rebut the charges against him before his conditional
liberty was revoked. "2 The Cummings (Fourth) court distinguished the
Morrissey case by noting the difference between the interests at stake
in the parole revocation hearing and those at stake in the parole release hearing. The court reasoned that in the parole revocation hearing the actual conditional liberty of the parolee was in jeopardy
whereas in the parole release hearing the mere anticipation of conditional liberty by the prisoner was at stake. 23 Thus, the Morrissey decision did not compel that due process attach in a parole release
hearing.
The Cummings (Fourth)court went on, however, to conclude that
certain "minimal due process protections" and the "dictates of fundamental fairness" 24 required a statement of reasons. In reaching this
conclusion the court used the balancing test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly. 25 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of what procedural safeguards, if any,
22. Under Morrissey, the parole revocation process consists of two stages. After
a parole violation has been alleged, there must be a prompt informal inquiry by an
impartial hearing officer to determine whether there is probable cause that a parole
violation has taken place. Upon determination that probable cause exists, the parolee is
held in custody pending a parole revocation hearing which must be conducted reasonably

soon after the arrest of the parolee. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1972).

At this parole revocation hearing the parolee must be furnished with a written statement of the violations that he has allegedly committed, and the evidence against him must
be disclosed. To rebut these charges, the parolee may present witnesses and documentary

evidence on his behalf and may also cross-examine adverse witnesses. In the event that
parole is revoked, a written statement of reasons for the revocation must be furnished
to the parolee along with the evidence relied upon to reach the decision. Id. at 487-90.
23. 45 App. Div. 2d at 226, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 264. The lower court did not make
this distinction between the interests of the parolee and those of the prospective parolee
at the hearings. It concluded that in both cases the interest was in conditional freedom;

thus, under Morrissey, due process attached at the release hearing. 76 Misc. 2d 137, 350
N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
24. 45 App. Div. 2d at 226, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 264.

25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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due process required before a state could terminate public assistance
payments to a recipient. In holding that a pretermination evidentiary
hearing was constitutionally required, the Court measured the extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded by considering three
factors: the extent to which a person may be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss";26 the interest of the person in avoiding that loss; and,
balanced against these factors, the governmental interest in summary
adjudication. Using this Goldberg formulation, the Cummings
(Fourth)court found that on balance the interest of the parole board
in "administrative confidentiality" 27 was far outweighed by the interest
of the prisoner in discovering the reasons for the denial of parole, the
interest of society in prisoner rehabilitation, and the interest of the
courts in informed judicial review.
B. Cummings (Third)-The Decision by the Third Department
In an action similar to that initiated in Cummings (Fourth), the
petitioner, Michael Cummings, and other named inmates who were
denied parole with no statement of reasons initiated a class action to
compel the board of parole to furnish a meaningful statement of
reasons. Special term granted the relief requested, 28 holding that inmates had an earned "right" to parole if the parole board is of the
opinion that they meet the statutory requirements, and that a statement of reasons for parole denial was necessary for effective judicial
review of whether this earned "right" had been denied without due
process of law. On appeal, the Appellate Division for the Third Department, with two judges dissenting, reversed, holding that the parole
board was under no constitutional or statutory duty to furnish reasons
for parole denial and that the demands of due process for the petitioner
were adequately met by the existing procedures for review of parole
2 91
denials.
The Cummings (Third) court rejected the argument put forth by
petitioners that a statement of reasons was warranted by the beneficial
26. Id. at 262-63.
27. The court never precisely defined this term. Presumably, the need for administrative confidentiality must refer to all those factors which weigh against granting a
statement of reasons, for example, the possibility that the statement of reasons will reveal
information which will be psychologically damaging to the prisoner.
28. Cummings v. Regan, 76 Misc. 2d 357, 350 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
29. Cummings (Third) at 415, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
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effect it would have on prisoner rehabilitation. Although it acknowledged the frustration and bitterness that the policy of silence generated,
the court found that this was an unfortunate by-product of the functioning of the parole board in ensuring that no prisoners were released
from prison "unless and until it [was] satisfied there [was] a 'reasonable
probability' that those released [would] pose no further menace to
society." 80 The court was unwilling to judicially impose on the parole
board the duty to state reasons for its parole denials. This policy, the
court concluded, must either be imposed by the legislature or adopted
by the parole board, but could not be mandated by the courts on public policy grounds.
The court next considered the question of whether a statement of
reasons for parole denial was constitutionally required. In analyzing
this issue, the court considered whether due process attached at the
parole release hearing, and, if so, whether a statement of reasons fell
within the scope of the required procedural protections. This was the
approach that the Supreme Court had used in Morrissey in considering the due process demands at a parole revocation hearing.3 1 To determine whether due process attached to any extent at the release
hearing, the court addressed itself to the question of whether the interest of the prospective parolee was within the contemplation of the
"liberty or property" language of the 14th amendment. This determination was an essential threshold requirement under the Morrissey formulation.' The court interpreted this Morrissey requirement to mean that a prisoner must have a "presently existing interest
in liberty or property threatened by further governmental deprivation." - The court found that the prisoner's interest did not meet this
test and thus would not "justifiably support a claim for due process
protection"84 at the parole release hearing.
Although it concluded that due process principles were not applicable at a release hearing, the court went on to examine whether a
statement of reasons would be required if due process did attach. To
answer this question, the court focused upon the usefulness of such a
statement in the judicial review of parole denials. The court empha30. Id. at 419, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 561.

31. 2 408 U.S. at 481.
32. Id.
33. 45 App. Div. 2d at 418, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 560.

34. Id.
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sized that a statement of reasons would not enlarge the scope of the
judicial review. The standard that a reviewing court would use with or
without a statement would remain the same-whether the parole
board's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 35 Furthermore, the relief
available under judicial review would be unaffected by the existence
of a statement of reasons for parole denial. The most that a reviewing
court could do, even with a statement of reasons, would be to direct
reconsideration of the case by the parole board; the court itself could
not release the prisoner. Finally, the court questioned whether a statement of reasons would perceptibly aid a reviewing court in determining whether impermissible reasons were the basis for the parole denial. The court based its conclusion on the premise that it would be
unlikely that the parole board would "baldly state an obviously illegal
reason."3 6 In the court's judgment, the net result of such a policy would
be only the generation of "specious litigation"3 7 by inmates. In light
of the limited effect that such a statement of reasons would have on
judicial review, the court concluded that the existing procedures for
review of parole denials were adequate to meet due process demands.
The result reached by the majority was criticized strongly by the
dissent as being "anachronistic" and inconsistent with the progressive
trend in this area of law.38 The dissent rejected the proposition put
forward by the majority that the decision denying parole merely extinguished a "hope" of the prisoner for release. On the contrary, the
parole release decision was said to be "one of the most critical decisions which can affect [the prisoner's] life and liberty." 39 Consequently, the prisoner would suffer "grievous loss" if the decision were
made arbitrarily. Therefore, the Goldberg balancing test must be used
to determine whether due process requires a statement of reasons.
Weighing the beneficial effects of a statement of reasons on judicial
review and prisoner rehabilitation against any governmental interest
in not giving reasons, the dissent concluded, as the Cummings
(Fourth)court had, that a statement of reasons was required.
The majority opinion also was criticized as being contrary to the
clear import of the recent court of appeals decision, Wilkinson v.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803(3) (McKinney 1963).
45 App. Div. 2d at 420, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
Id.
Id. at 421, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (Cooke & Sweeney, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 422, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
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Skinner.40 In Wilkinson, the court held that a statement of reasons
was constitutionally required when a prison official punished or withheld privileges from a prisoner. The dissent found the Wilkinson
situation similar to the parole release denial in that both involved
liberty withheld, the difference being only a matter of degree. Accordingly, the minimal due process safeguard should be the same in both
cases-a statement of reasons.

II.

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE APPELLATE DECISIONS

A. Public Policy Considerations
In viewing parole as a vital part of the rehabilitative process, the
court in Cummings (Fourth)accurately reflected the present attitude
towards parole taken by the courts and commentators on the parole
system. Parole is no longer looked upon as an act of grace or privilege
bestowed upon the prisoner by a beneficient state, a concept which had
its roots in the 1985 Supreme Court decision, Escoe v. Zerbst, in which
Mr. Justice Cardozo stated in dicta that "[p]robation or suspension of
sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime."' 41 Instead, parole is now seen as an "attempt to achieve the reintegration
of all prisoners into society,"' ' in either an atmosphere of maximum
freedom or controlled rehabilitation. 43 The Supreme Court in Morrissey noted and approved of this new interpretation of parole:
Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an
established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals. Its
purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able .... 44
In New York, the court of appeals also has taken cognizance of this
development in parole theory. In its 1971 decision, People ex rel.
Menechino v. Warden,45 which held that a parolee had a constitutional
right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing, the court recognized
40. 34 N.Y.2d 53, 312 N.E.2d 158, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1974).

41. 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
42. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 289 (1971).
43. Id.

44. 408 U.S. at 477.
45. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
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parole as "an enlightened effort on the part of society to rehabilitate
convicted criminals." 46
Under this progressive view of parole, the twin goals of rehabilitation and reintegration are emphasized. These goals were completely
ignored by the Cummings (Third) court in its narrow view of the
purpose of parole-namely to provide a screen to prevent the release
of dangerous prisoners into society. It is true that the parole board
must consider whether the release is incompatible with the welfare
of society. 47 However, the board must also determine whether there
is a reasonable probability that the prisoner will integrate himself
into society. 4 Modem parole theory has transformed this second predictive function of the board into an evaluation of whether the prisoner
will be aided in his rehabilitation by parole. The third department
in its analysis completely disregarded this second function, of the
board in the parole process.
Since parole has become a vital part of the correction system, the
policies governing the parole process must be evaluated in light of
their effect on prisoner rehabilitation, the goal of the system. The
court in Cummings (Fourth) sharply criticized the policy of denying
reasons for parole denial as being "counterproductive" and a source
of "frustration and bitterness." 49 Even the Cummings (Third) court,
which was oblivious to the salutary effects of a statement of reasons on
prisoner rehabilitation, was forced to acknowledge this frustration.50
The magnitude of this frustration and bitterness was made clear by
the McKay Commission report on the tragic riots at the Attica Correctional Facility in 1971:
[T]he operation of the parole system was a primary source of tension and bitterness within the walls.
...
Nobody gives the inmate an explanation for [the parole
board's] apparently inconsistent decisions or describes in anything
more than meaningless generalities the criteria used by the board in
arriving at its decisions....

Far from instilling confidence in the Parole Board's sense of
46. Id. at 385-86, 267 N.E.2d at 243, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
47. N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1975).

48. Id.
49. 45 App. Div. 2d at 226, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
50. 45 App. Div. 2d at 419, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
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justice, the existing procedure merely confirms to inmates, including
those receiving favorable decisions, that the system is indeed capricious
and demeaning.5 1
Professionals in the parole field also have been sensitive to the unfairness of leaving a prisoner in the dark as to the reasons for his
parole denial. As the former chairman of the Federal Parole Board
commented:
I don't believe it's fair to turn a man down and not tell him why.
52
He's entitled to know why and what he can do to improve.
In addition to the beneficial effects on a particular inmate, a
policy of stating reasons for parole denial would create an atmosphere
of fairness and openness throughout the system. It would dispel any
impression that inmates may have that sub rosa judgments are being
made based on vague and punitive reasons 53 or as a result of corruption.54 As one commentator noted, the system must not only be fair,
but must also give the appearance of being fair. 5 This sense of fairness and adherence to the rehabilitative ideal is reflected in the fact
that over half of the parole boards in the country furnish reasons,
either written or oral, for parole denial.56
The courts have been aware of the difficulties that might arise if
a parole board were compelled to give reasons for parole denial. As
one court described it, the board must make a "predictive evaluation
of human conduct in one of the most complex of human situations,
and in circumstances in which erroneous decision is inevitably de,57
structive either of [the prisoner's interest] or of public interests. ....
Consequently, defining precisely the reasons for parole denial may be
difficult. There is also the possibility of an increase in groundless appeals since a statement of reasons will provide points of contention for
those inmates seeking to review valid parole denials. Finally, there is
51. Naw YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, supra note 4,at 93-98.
52. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1973, § 6,at 24.
53. O'Leary & Nuffield, A National Survey of Parole Decision-Making 19 CIME
& DELIN. 378, 385 (1973).
54. NEw YoRK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, supra note 4,at 97.
55. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 53, at 385.
56. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
934 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp.
416,419 (E.D.N.Y.1973).
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the administrative burden that would be placed upon the parole board
and its staff to compose and process these statements.
These factors have not persuaded many courts, however, to allow
parole boards to continue withholding reasons for parole denial. In its
consideration of the necessity for a statement of reasons, the California Supreme Court found that the administrative burden on the
California Parole Board in supplying inmates with reasons would not
be so onerous as to be unworkable. 5s As for the argument that a statement of reasons would be an invitation to inmates to engage in "specious litigation and wasted legal effort,"r0 the dissent in the Cummings (Third) case accurately characterized these fears as "speculative
and totally inadequate to sustain the board's interest in not disclosing
its reason."' 0 Although the task of stating reasons for parole denial
may be difficult because of the high degree of discretion involved, the
necessity of stating reasons for the decision will produce fairer and
more consistent decisions. The decisionmaker will be forced to think
through the reasons for his decision and, presumably, filter out vague,
imprecise or even punitive reasons.01 The decisionmaker will also
have to reconcile to some degree his decision with the existing body of
decisions. After considering both the advantages and disadvantages in
requiring such a statement of reasons, the courts have struck the
balance in favor of a policy of openness: "[T]he difficulty of decision
and the patent risks involved in giving expression to the ground of a
decision denying parole-inviting deceptive enactment of an unreal
'rehabilitation' charade-cannot justify mute denials that create a
62
risk of anomie and deny guidance."
B. The Due ProcessIssue
For more than a quarter of a century, the parole process was
considered outside the scope of procedural due process because of the
Supreme Court's characterization in Escoe v. Zerbst °3 of probation and
parole as privileges rather than rights requiring due process protec58. In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 272, 521 P.2d 97, 106, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 370
(1974).
59. Cummings (Third) at 420, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
60. Id. at 423, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 562 (Cooke & Sweeney, JJ., dissenting).
61. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 53, at 385.
62. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp.
416, 419 (E.D.N.Y.1973).
63. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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tion. This right-privilege distinction reflected in Escoe was finally rejected as a viable approach to the question of what due process requires in a particular situation by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly. Instead, under the Goldberg formulation, the amount of due
process protection necessary in any situation must be measured
through the use of a balancing test in which the interests of the individual are weighed against those of the state. The Goldberg formulation was utilized by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer. The
Court qualified the Goldberg formulation, however, by requiring not
only that the "weight" of the individual's interest be considered, but
also that the interest be one which is protected by the 14th amendment. The Morrissey court found that the liberty that a parolee enjoyed was constitutionally protected, and as a result, due process attached at the parole revocation hearing.64 Thus, the Morrissey decision
firmly established that the parole process was no longer totally immune
from constitutional scrutiny under the due process clause.
The Supreme Court in Morrissey dealt only with the parole revocation hearing and never spoke directly to the question of what constitutional rights a prisoner has at a parole release hearing. However,
in distinguishing between the condition of a parolee at liberty and
that of a prisoner in confinement, the Court, in a footnote, quoted a
portion of a Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision which identified the prospective parolee's interest as the "mere anticipation or
hope of freedom."6 5 The import of this reference is not dear. The
implication may be that the Court for due process, purposes considered the prospective parolee's interest as only the anticipation of
freedom, which may not fall within the contemplation of the "liberty
or property" language of the 14th amendment. 6 In that case, due
process would not attach under the Morrissey formulation.6 7 On the
other hand, the reference may be interpreted as meaning only that not
all the due process protections required at a parole revocation hearing by Morrissey are necessary in a parole release hearing. s It is this
64. See note 22 supra.
65. 408 U.S. at 482 n.8, quoting United States ex rel. Bey v.Connecticut Bd. of
Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971).
66. Cf. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C.
1973); cf. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
927 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ambiguity in Morrissey that has created uncertainty among the courts,
including the two Cummings courts, as to whether due process attaches
at the parole release hearing.
Despite this ambiguity, the overwhelming majority of the courts
that have ruled on the question since Morrissey have held that a statement of reasons for parole denial must be furnished by the parole
board. Those federal district courts that have had an opportunity
to consider the question in light of Morrissey have found almost
unanimously that a statement of reasons is a constitutional requirement.69 At the appellate level, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Board of
Parole70 vigorously affirmed the lower court decision 7' upholding the
right of prisoners to a statement of reasons, although its decision was
later vacated as moot by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reached the same result for prisoners in the
federal parole system by way of interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Act.72 Among the federal courts, the one exception to this
trend has been the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which found
no justification for a right to a statement of reasons in the Constitution.73 However, this appellate decision was also vacated as moot by
the Supreme Court. The highest courts in two states, New Jersey and
California, confronted this question, and both ruled that a statement
of reasons was required. The New Jersey decision,74 which came before
69. United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973); Childs v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973); United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York
State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
70. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974).
71. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp.
416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974). The court in King
found that the federal parole board was a government "agency" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970), and therefore the parole board's actions were subject to the provisions of that Act. Consequently, the court found that a
statement of reasons for parole denial must be furnished under the mandate of section
555(e) of the Act, which provides that notice of the denial of any request or petition
to the agency "shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial."
The King court never reached the due process question, although it intimated that in
light of Morrissey "some modicum of due process should attend the denial of... parole."
492 F.2d at 1343.
73. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
74. Monks v. New Jersey Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
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Morrissey, was based not on due process considerations, but on the
necessity of a statement of reasons for adequate judicial review of
parole denials. The California decision, 75 on the other hand, held that
the right to a statement of reasons was constitutionally mandated.
In New York, the court of appeals has not had an opportunity to
consider the impact of Morrissey on the New York law concerning
prisoners' rights at a parole release hearing. However, the rejection in
Morrissey of the privilege concept of parole dealt a serious blow to
the leading New York case in the area, Briguglio v. New York State
Board of Parole,76 decided in 1969. In Briguglio, the court of appeals
foreclosed all investigation into the extent of procedural protection
necessary at the release hearing by ruling that because parole was a
privilege due process did not attach at the hearing. That the Briguglio
decision has been undermined by Morrissey is indicated by the fact
that neither the two Cummings courts nor any of the lower New York
courts ruling on the due process issue have considered it controlling
authority.
Some light may have been shed upon the due process issue by the
recent court of appeals decision, Wilkinson v. Skinner 7 7 As mentioned
above, in Wilkinson., the court held that minimum due process required that, prior to punishing a prsoner or withholding privileges
from him, prison officials must furnish the prisoner with a written
statement of the charges against him, the evidence relied upon, and
an opportunity to rebut those charges. The court further held that the
prisoner must be furnished with a statement of reasons for the punishment or the denial of the privilege. It was stressed that these requirements were essential for judicial review of the officials' decisions in
order to ascertain whether impermissible considerations had crept
into the decisionmaking process.
The implications of the Wilkinson decision were considered by
both the majority and dissent in Cummings (Third). The majority
viewed the holding in Wilkinson to be limited to those situations in
which a restriction on an existing degree of freedom of an inmate had
taken place, and not when the decision merely maintained the existing status of the prisoner, as in parole denial. This distinction is not
75. In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
76. 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969).
77. 34 N.Y.2d 53, 312 N.E.2d 158, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1974).
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supported, however, by the unambiguous language used by the court
in Wilkinson: "If detention officials did not have to give reasons for
their actions in punishing or withholding privileges from an inmate,
they could in effect, act in an unconstitutional manner safely screened
from court or administrative review."78 Thus, the Wilkinson court did
not differentiate between punishing and withholding privileges from
an inmate in terms of the due process consequences. Yet, withholding
a privilege from an inmate is nothing more than restricting him to the
degree of freedom he presently enjoys. The distinction made by the
majority in Cummings (Third) is thus invalid. Not only is this distinction illogical, but it also leads to the incongruous result that a prisoner
with the chance of being released from prison on parole has fewer
procedural protections at his hearing than the prisoner being denied
some minor privilege. As the dissent in Cummings (Third) pointed out,
the only true difference between the parole release situation and the
situation dealt with in Wilkinson is the amount of freedom withheld,
and due process requires a statement of reasons in both cases: "If an
inmate subject to internal prison discipline about to be further restricted in his 'limited freedom' within the prison walls has a due
process right to know the reason therefore, .

.

. so too should the

eligible inmate with the hope of greater freedom in being released,
know why parole was denied." 79 The Wilkinson decision indicates that even if parole is viewed as a privilege, a statement of reasons
is required when this "privilege" is withheld.
In the absence of controlling New York authority, the Cummings
courts considered the due process issue under the principles set forth
in Morrissey. In the Morrissey formulation, the crucial threshold determination was whether the interest involved was one that was
within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of
the 14th amendment. In the case of the parole release hearing, this
question reduces itself to whether the interest of the prospective
parolee is the hope or anticipation of conditional liberty, which would
not be a protected interest in the Morrissey sense, or actual conditional
liberty, which in Morrissey was found to be constitutionally protected.
Both Cummings courts concluded that the interest of the prospective parolee at a release hearing was the anticipation of conditional
78. Id. at 57, 312 N.E.2d at 161, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
79. 45 App. Div. 2d at 423-24, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (emphasis in original) (Cooke
& Sweeney, JJ., dissenting).
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liberty, not conditional liberty itself. This result cannot withstand
close analysis. The interest of the prospective parolee should be measured by the possible outcomes of the parole release hearing, namely
conditional freedom or continued confinement. The logic of defining
the interest involved in terms of the outcomes of the proceeding can
be demonstrated by examining the case of a person who must obtain
an administrative ruling before he can engage in a particular course
of conduct, for example, a person seeking to acquire a license in
order to sell alcoholic beverages. What is at stake is the ability of
the person to engage in a particular practice, not merely the hope or
anticipation of engaging in that practice. The courts have held that
in situations of this type, due process to some extent attaches.80 Similarly, in the case of a parole release hearing the interest at stake has
to be measured by the possible outcome of the decisionmaking process,
conditional freedom. As one court put it:
When we examine the nature of the interest of the parolee facing
revocation and that of the parolee applicant in the light of the ultimate effect of the Parole Board's determination, it appears obvious
that the difference is not enough to exclude the applicant from due
process protections. This is so simply because the stakes are the same,
incarceration or conditional freedom.8 1
In its discussion of this point, the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit in Johnson, which prior to Morrissey had not recognized the
prospective parolee's interest as protected by due process, was recently
forced to conclude that
[p]arole [must be] treated as a "conditional liberty," representing
an "interest" entitled to due process protection. A prisoner's interest
in prospective parole, or "conditional entitlement," must be treated
in like fashion. To hold otherwise would be to create a distinction
too gossamer-thin to stand close analysis. s2
80. E.g., Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (right
of certified public accountant to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals); Hornsby

v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964) (right to obtain a retail liquor store license);

cf. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

368 U.S. 930 (1961).
81. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (D.D.C.
1973).
82. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,

928 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Of the federal courts that have considered the question of the
interest at stake,83 only the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 4 ruled that the interest was
the anticipation of liberty. The Scarpa decision was also the only federal decision since Morrissey which held that due process principles
were not applicable at the parole release hearing. In a divided opinion, three judges dissenting and three judges concurring in the holding, the court, sitting en banc, found that the parole denial did not
deprive the prospective parolee of any type of liberty that was constitutionally protected. On the contrary, the court reasoned that "[i]f
the Board refuses to grant parole, [the prospective parolee] has suffered no deprivations. He continues the sentence originally imposed
by the court."8 5 This understatement is indicative of the court's almost
cavalier disregard of the crucial nature of the parole hearing to the
prisoner who may have been waiting years for this parole determination. Reduced to its essentials, the distinction made by both the
Scarpa and Cummings (Third) courts between actual freedom and
anticipated freedom is nothing more than a subtle reincarnation of
the discredited right-privilege distinction laid to rest by Goldberg.80
Neither of these distinctions is relevant any longer in due process
analysis, and only. serves to turn due process into a fixed, inflexible
concept.
The Cummings (Fourth) court felt constrained to rule that the
interest of the prisoner at the parole release hearing was the anticipation of freedom. Nevertheless, it avoided this cul-de-sac in constitutional due process law by using a balancing test which gives the interest
of the prisoner its proper weight but does not ignore the various other
factors involved. This approach is entirely consistent with and encouraged by the Supreme Court decision in Goldberg which stressed
an evaluation of the entire calculus of interests that is present in any
interaction between the state and the citizen. The Goldberg inquiry
into what "grievous loss" will be suffered can embrace many of the
factors that the Cummings (Fourth) court weighed in its balancing
83. Id.; United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 363 F.
Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246
(D.D.C. 1973).

84. 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
85. Id. at 282.
86. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 928 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
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test, if the loss is measured in terms of all of the effects of the government adjudication on the individual. In being denied parole and not
being given reasons for the denial, the prisoner is being deprived of
whatever interest he had in the outcome of the decision, whether that
be the anticipation of conditional freedom or conditional freedom.
In addition, the prisoner's loss must also be measured by the debilitating effect of the absence of a statement of reasons on his rehabilitation and his ability to initiate a review of his parole denial. Absent
consideration of these important additional factors, any analysis of due
process demands at the parole release hearing would be incomplete
and superficial.
The California Supreme Court, faced with this same dilemma
created by the Morrissey decision, also utilized a balancing approach
in its carefully reasoned opinion, In re Sturm.8 7 At the outset, the
court identified the interest of the prisoner at the parole release hearing as the anticipation of freedom. Under Morrissey, this determination would have ended the analysis since the anticipation of freedom
is not a protected interest. Perceiving the restrictiveness of this approach, the court refused to consider Morrissey controlling, justifying
its decision by noting the differences between the parole release and
revocation hearings. Instead, it chose to use the approach set forth
by the Supreme Court in Hannah v. Larch"" which called for a caseby-case investigation of the requirements of due process. The court
considered three factors in its analysis: the objectives sought to be
achieved by the challenged procedure, the possible unfairness to the
prisoner, and the availability of alternative procedures which are less
burdensome to the prisoner. Weighing these factors, the court concluded that due process required a statement of reasons. The balancing
test in Sturm is thus analogous to that in Cummings (Fourth).In both,
the characterization of the interest of the prisoner was not dispositive
of the due process issue and did not preclude an evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances as required by Goldberg.
Another aspect of the due process issue which was not touched
upon by either of the Cummings courts but which warrants discussion
is the question of the nature of the parole release hearing. The argument has been made by at least one court19 that the parole release
87. 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
88. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
89. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
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hearing is not an adversary proceeding and thus does not involve due
process protections. It is questionable whether this theory is tenable
in light of the Morrissey and Goldberg decisions. This view of the
parole release hearing as nonadversarial is based on the theory that the
parole board is acting in the capacity of parens patriaeto the parolee or
prospective parolee. 90 It is doubtful, however, that the parole board
actualy functions in this manner. The belief that the interests of the
parole board and the prospective parolee coincide at all times, which
is an essential feature of the parens patriae theory, may be erroneous. 0 1
One commentator has argued that a more accurate view of the situation would recognize the tension between the conflicting desires of the
prisoner and the parole board:
At the parole release determination there are definite adverse interests:
the prisoner always has an interest in his freedom; the parole board's
interest in his freedom exists only if a release would further his rehabilitation and not endanger the public. 2
The parens patriae theory has also been undercut by the rejection in
Morrissey of the privilege concept of parole which gave strength to
the theory by placing absolute discretion in the parole board in the
determination of a prisoner's suitability for parole. Moreover, even if
this parens patriae theory is valid, procedural safeguards do not vanish simply because this relationship exists. This was the lesson of In re
Gault,93 in which the Supreme Court held that certain procedural

safeguards were necessary in a juvenile court proceeding despite the
well-established principle that juvenile court is in the relation of
parens patriaeto the juvenile.
In going beyond the controversy concerning the adversarial or
nonadversarial nature of the parole release hearing, a more fundamental question emerges in the wake of the Morrissey decision: Is the
distinction still relevant to due process analysis? The requirement that
a proceeding be adversarial in nature before due process principles are
applicable is not found in either the Goldberg or Morrissey decisions.
Rather, the crucial determination in both those cases concerned the
90. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Thompson v. United States Bd. of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
91. Comment, supra note 42, at 361.
92. Id.

93. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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nature of the interests involved and the procedures by which the particular administrative body rendered its judgment. Th&courts have
recognized the effect of Morrissey and Goldberg on the continued usefulness of this distinction in due process analysis. After Morrissey,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not consider it necessary to deal with this distinction although the court had relied heavily
upon it in a prior consideration of the due process issue. 94 Instead,
the court in Johnson 5 weighed the interests of the prisoner against
those of the parole board at the parole release hearing and held that
minimal due process attached to the extent that a statement of reasons
was required.
C. Judicial Review
The Cummings (Third) court in its refusal to compel the parole
board to furnish reasons for parole denials found that a statement of
reasons would not enhance judicial review of these decisions. The court
justified this assessment on two grounds. First, the scope of relief that
can be provided by a reviewing court will not be enlarged by a statement of reasons; in other words, a statement showing an arbitrary
parole denial would not result in the release of the prisoner. Second,
the reviewing court cannot investigate the "merits" of a case even
if it is aided by a statement of reasons. Presumably, the court meant
by this that the reviewing court could not sit as a "super-parole
board" and usurp the decisionmaking power of the board.
By focusing upon the effect that a statement of reasons would
have on the relief that could be afforded by a reviewing court, the
Cummings (Third) court ignored the effect the statement would have
on the effective operation of judicial review. Under New York law,
the reviewing court must test whether the parole decision was made
in "violation of lawful procedure" or was "arbitrary and capricious."9 6
It is only after this determination has been made that the court fashions
the relief appropriate.9 7 The primary determination by the reviewing court therefore concerns the lawfulness of the actions of the administrative body, and the decision as to the relief is clearly secondary
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
500 F.2d 925 (2d Gir. 1974).
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803(3) (McKinney 1963).
Id. § 7806.
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and derivative. The reversal by the Cummings (Third) court of the
priority of these two aspects of judicial review is thus contrary to the
statutory scheme. In fact, when carried to its logical conclusion, the
reasoning of the Cummings (Third) court leads to the incongruous result that any aid to judicial review, no matter how beneficial, would be
unnecessary because it would have no effect on the relief available.
The second, more important argument made by the court involving the limits on the scope of judicial review also suffers from the
same shortsighted view of the function of judicial review. It is true
that a reviewing court may not investigate the "merits" of a case in
such a way as to invade the province of decisionmaking of an administrative body.9 8 However, the decisionmaking process in parole determinations consists of several steps. The first is the accumulation of
necessary reports containing accurate information about the prisoner.
Many of these reports are required by statute 09 The second step is
the evaluation of this information by the board in order to reach
certain conclusions about the prisoner. The third, and final, step
is to predict on the basis of these conclusions, with proper weight given
to each based on some theory or model of parole, 100 whether the
prisoner is suitable for parole. 10 1 The reviewing court must test the
parole decision at these various levels. There is little chance, however,
that in reviewing the first two stages of the decisionmaking process
involving the accumulation of information and the logical conclusions
arrived at by the board, the reviewing court will substitute its own
98. Caruci v. Dulan, 41 Misc. 2d 859, 862, 246 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (Sup. Ct.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 529, 261 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't
1965); cf. Meschino v. Lowery, 34 App. Div. 2d 255, 310 N.Y.S.2d 908 (lst Dep't
1970).
99. N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 211, 214 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
100. Some factors that the New York parole board has considered in their parole
release decisions are: (1) whether the inmate has undergone rehabilitation while in
prison; (2) whether, in the opinion of the parole board members, the inmate has served
an "appropriate" amount of time in prison for the particular offense he has committed,
(3) whether the inmate's case is a "sensitive" one, for example, involving racketeering,
serious institutional misconduct, or exceptional publicity or notoriety; and (4) whether
the inmate has cooperated with law enforcement officials. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS
55-62.
101. In the terminology of administrative law this decisionmaking process consists of the administrative agency determining the "ultimate facts" and the "basic
findings" upon which these ultimate facts rest. K. DAvis, AnaINISTRATIvE LAw § 16.06
(1958). In the case of a parole decision, the ultimate fact would be the conclusion that
the prisoner is unfit for parole, and the basic findings would be the various facts supporting this conclusion. Both the ultimate facts and the basic findings are subjects of
judicial review. Id.
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judgment for that of the board. It is only in reviewing the final, predictive stage, that there is a danger of the reviewing court ugurping
the power of the board. That this danger exists does not, however,
justify barring a reviewing court from making any inquiry into the
actions of the parole board. Rather, in the final stage the reviewing
court must be especially wary of second guessing the parole board.
It is in reference to this multi-step reviewing process that the usefulness of a statement of reasons must be measured.
A statement of reasons has been traditionally recognized as an
essential prerequisite for effective judicial review. As the Supreme
Court stated: "[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review
requires the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be
dearly disclosed and adequately sustained."' 1 2 Both the Morrissey
and Goldberg decisions embodied this requirement as an essential facet
of minimum due process protection.0 3 In the parole determination
process, where the discretion given to the parole board is great, a
statement of reasons is all the more necessary since it is the only way
that a reviewing court can determine the lawfulness of a parole decision. Specifically, disclosure of the grounds of the parole decision
will "permit the reviewing court to determine whether the Board has
adopted and followed criteria that are appropriate, rational and consistent, and also [protects] the inmate against arbitrary and capricious
decisions or actions based upon impermissible considerations."',0 4 It is
not enough to say, as the Cummings (Third) court did, that a statement of reasons will not reveal impermissible reasons because the
parole board will not be likely to "baldly" state these unlawful reasons.
This would mean that no judicial review at all would be useful or
necessary if it can be shown that the parole board is careful enough to
disguise its unlawful actions-an obviously absurd result. Simply
stated, a statement of reasons is necessary for judicial review because
it provides a reviewing court with information with which to effectively perform its function. Without this information, a reviewing
102. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). See also K. DAVIs, supra
note 101, at § 16.12.
103. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.

254, 271 (1970).
104. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 929 (2d Cir. 1974). See also In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1974); Monks v. New Jersey Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193
(1971).
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court is left in the dark as to the reasons and lawfulness of the parole
board's action, and the board is permitted to operate within or without the law as it sees fit.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The decision by the Cummings (Fourth)court represents a vital
step forward in the area of prisoners' rights. One of the more important
of these rights is that of the prisoner to obtain a meaningful judicial
review of a parole denial. There is little doubt that a statement of
reasons will aid a court in reviewing a parole denial. It is less clear,
however, what the full impact of a statement of reasons on judicial
review will be. This will depend to a large extent on the form the
statement takes and the type of information that the courts will require in a statement to make it meaningful.
In the past, a combination of factors has resulted in parole release decisions enjoying almost total immunity from judicial review.
Under article 78105 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
which is the statutory vehicle for judicial review of parole denials,
the reviewing court must test whether the parole decision is arbitrary
and capricious, yet may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
parole board. 106 Moreover, the reviewing court cannot make findings
of fact, but can only inquire into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact made by the administrative
body. 07 If, after reviewing the parole denial in this restricted fashion,
the reviewing court finds the denial to be arbitrary and capricious,
the most that the court can do is direct further consideration of the
case by the parole board.0 8 Thus, both the type of review and the relief that can be provided are limited in their scope.
Aside from the statutory restrictions imposed on judicial review,
several other factors affect the review of these decisions. The statutory
criteria for parole release are couched in vague and ambiguous language, 10 9 making it difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether
105. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7803(3) (McKinney 1963).
106. See Caruci v. Dulan, 41 Misc. 2d 859, 246 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
107. Zeidler v. Board of Superiors, 35 App. Div. 2d 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d 776 (2d
Dep't 1970); Phinn v. Kross, 8 App. Div. 2d 132, 186 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1st Dep't 1959).
108. O'Connor v. State Bd. of Parole, 270 App. Div. 93, 58 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d
Dep't 1945).
109. See text accompanying note 8 supra.

PAROLE DENIAL

a parole decision was made arbitrarily. Even in dealing- with clear
statutory requirements such as those requiring the parole board to
make the parole release decision after studying certain reports on the
prisoner," 0 a reviewing court has no way of knowing whether the
parole board actually considered all the necessary information and
whether the information contained in the reports was current and
accurate. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that a prisoner does
not have access to any of this information.1" Thus, the prisoner is in
no position to refute any of the information or bring any inaccuracies
to the attention of the reviewing court. The final obstacle to judicial
review of parole release decisions was created by the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in 1946 in Hines v. State Board of Parole,"2 in
which the court ruled that
the action of the Board in releasing or refusing to release prisoners
shall not be reviewable if in accordance with law. Thus, so long as
the Board violates no positive statutory requireient its discretion is
absolute and beyond review in the courts."13
The Hines decision foreclosed all investigation by a reviewing court
unless there was some indication that a positive statutory violation had
taken place. Without a statement of reasons by the parole board, however, a reviewing court had no clue as to the lawfulness of the parole
decision and was hamstrung in its attempt at review.
A statement of reasons will improve this situation considerably.
Although the statement of reasons will not necessarily allow the reviewing court to judge whether all the necessary information was
considered by the parole board in its decisionmaking process as required by statute, the statement will allow the reviewing court to test
the veracity of any information given in the statement and the validity
of the conclusions drawn from that information. The exact form this
review will take will depend upon the type of information given in
the statement of reasons. The statement cannot, of course, simply state
that the parole board believes that the prisoner's release is incom110. N.Y. CoRnEC. LAw §§ 211, 214 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
111. While there may be some rational basis for prohibiting an inmate from seeing
certain information, for example, psychiatric reports, on the ground that this knowledge
may be deleterious to his rehabilitation, it is difficult to conceive of any reason why
the objective information in the case file should not be made available to the inmate.
112. 293 N.Y. 254,56 N.E.2d 572 (1944).
113. Id. at 257, 56 N.E.2d at 573.
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patible with the welfare of society and that it believes that the prisoner
will not live in society without violating the law. The statement may,
however, contain only conclusory statements not supported by facts.
In that situation, the reviewing court could only inquire into whether
the particular reason or reasons given to justify parole denial are rationally related to the statutory criteria. For example, the statement of
reasons may state that: "The prisoner is denied parole on the basis
of his continually disruptive behavior while in prison." Faced with
this conclusory statement, the reviewing court will have to determine
whether it is arbitrary and capricious for the parole board to use
prison behavior as a standard for measuring parole qualifications, and
further whether continually disruptive behavior while in prison is
sufficient to disqualify the prisoner for parole. However, unless the
prisoner presents evidence to rebut the charge of his continually disruptive behavior, there is no way for the reviewing court to judge
from the statement of reasons itself whether the actions of the inmate
within the prison actually warranted the conclusion that his actions
were continually disruptive.
A better and more comprehensive form that the statement of
reasons could take would be one in which both the conclusions
reached by the parole board and the substantiating facts are stated.
This format is the one traditionally required by reviewing courts to
substantiate determinations made by administrative agencies.1 14 A
statement of this form would add a new dimension to the review of the
parole denial. A reviewing court not only would consider whether the
conclusions reached are proper grounds for parole denial, but also
would consider whether the facts stated are supported by substantial
evidence and whether these facts support the conclusions reached. In
making these determinations, the court would be prohibited from
acting as a "super-parole board" by second guessing the parole board
in its determination of what factors are to be used in gauging parole
qualifications and the weight given to each factor. The basic function
of the reviewing court would remain the same, namely, to ascertain
whether the parole denial is reasonably supported by the information
given in the statement of reasons.
The courts have differed in ruling on what a statement of reasons
for parole denial should contain. Some courts have required only a
114. See K. DAvis, supra note 101, at § 16.06.

PAROLE DENIAL
"meaningful" 5 or "definitive" 1 6 statement of reasons. Others have
required a statement of reasons based on salient facts or factors," 7 or
one which specified the ultimate grounds of parole denial with sufficient
particularity to enable the prisoner to understand how he is expected
to regulate his conduct and to enable the reviewing court to determine
whether inadmissible factors entered into the decision."18 The most
detailed description of what the statement should contain was given
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Johnson."9 The
court in that case required that the statement be sufficiently detailed
to show whether parole had been denied for impermissible reasons
or for no reasons at all. The court did not require detailed findings
of fact. It did, however, require that the parole board consider all
relevant factors and furnish to the inmate the grounds for its decision
and the essential facts upon which the Board's inferences were based.
For the purpose of judicial review, a detailed statement of reasons
containing both the reasons for the parole denial and the essential facts
to support them is necessary. The reviewing court should not have to
speculate as to the basis of the decision. 20 A statement containing both
the grounds for the denial and the supporting facts would prevent
that problem from arising. In addition to aiding the reviewing court
in its task, a detailed statement of reasons would be necessary for the
prisoner who has been denied parole and is contemplating an appeal.
A statement of reasons containing merely conclusory statements would
have little value for the prisoner in this respect. Even if the prisoner
decided not to appeal, the more precise the statement of reasons is,
the better able the prisoner is to regulate his conduct in the future in
order to obtain parole. Finally, these detailed written decisions rendered by the parole board will form a body of decisions for the board
to look to for guidance in its decisionmaking and for the reviewing
courts to analyze in determining the reasonableness of a particular
decision.
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CONCLUSION

The Cummings (Fourth) decision upholding the right of a prisoner to a statement of reasons for parole denial is clearly in line
with the progressive trend throughout the nation, from both the standpoint of constitutional law and modern penological theory. The Cummings (Third) decision must be viewed as retrogressive, representing
a discredited school of thought that considers the rights of prisoners
as outside the protection of the Constitution. While the Cummings
(Fourth) decision is a victory for prisoners asserting their rights as
members of society, the victory may be a hollow one. Requiring the
parole board to furnish reasons may be meaningless unless the reasons
given have substance to them and are not just a parroting of the vague
statutory criteria. It will be the duty of the courts in their review of
parole denials to ensure that not only the letter but also the spirit of
the law embodied in Cummings (Fourth)are adhered to by the parole
board. This can only be accomplished by requiring the board to furnish
a statement of reasons containing the conclusions reached by the board
and the evidence relied upon. Anything less would deprive the prisoner of the full measure of protection from arbitrary and capricious
actions by the government to which all other members of society are entitled.
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